Art And Literature

"ART AND LITERATURE, 1910-21 Art. - All the Austrian artists who had been most characteristic of the age of Francis Joseph died about the year 1890. They had built a new Vienna and transformed the large provincial towns. The keynote of their style might be described as Austrian imperial sentiment. This common quality was also true of the decadent period of this style, which reached its height in 1890; and even after the World War it still had its representatives. Notable in this class were, among architects, Karl KOnig (1841-1915); among sculptors, Karl Kundemann (1838-1919) and Kasper Zumbusch (1830-1915) in Vienna, and Josef Myslbek (b. 1848) in Prague; among painters the Czech Brozik (1851-1899), the Pole Jan Matejko (1838-1893), and the Viennese portrait-painters L. Horowitz (1843-1917) and Heinrich von Angell (b. 1840). Others, such as the painter Adalbert Hynais (b. 1854) of Prague, and the Viennese sculptor Eduard Hellmer (b. 1850), or the Viennese engraver Ferdinand Schmutzer (b. 1870), displayed symptoms of a transitional style, dominated by an international influence. Austrian artists now sought every kind of contact abroad; many studied and lived in Munich, Berlin and Paris. As examples may be cited the Czech painters Antonin Slavicek (1870-1910) and Max Svabinsky (b. 1873), the Pole Jacek Malczewski (b. 1855), and the artists who in 1897 founded the Viennese Independents (Wiener Sezession). Evidence of their success in bringing new life to a dead tradition was given by the painter Rudolf Alt (1812-1905), who in " 1917 " " 1918 .

Up to the end of the World War the Vienna Burgtheater had still the ambition of ranking with the Comedic Francaise as the first theatre of the continent of Europe. The dialect drama, to which Raimund, Nestrey and Anzengruber had contributed, still had the reputation of being, as Platen said, a popular form of comedy which is more comic than the whole of the German theatre. In the meantime the Burgtheater lost its brilliant doyen Bernhard Baumeister (1828-1917), and its greatest master of declamation, the famous emotional actor, Josef Kainz (1858-1918). Finally Alexander Girardi (1850-1918) died too, the popular Viennese comedian, whose gift for music and improvisation showed him no unworthy representative of the Italian tradition.

See Albert Soergel, Dichtung and Dichter der Zeit (1916); Oscar F. Walzel, Die deutsche Dichtung seit Goethes Tod (1919); Alfred Maderno, Die deutsch-osterreichische Dichtung der Gegenwart (1920).

(A. B.) History. - During 1910-20 the influence of the work of Theodor von Sickel (1826-1908), and of the Austrian Institute for Historical Research, had been brought by him to a high pitch of excellence, was shown in a marked activity on the part of Austrian historical writers. In the footsteps of Sickel, and also of his great contemporary Julius von Ficker (1826-1902), came their disciples Engelbert Miihlbacher (1853-1903) and Emil von Oltenthal (b. 1855); Oswald Redlich (b. 1858), with his Rudolf von Habsburg; Alfons Dopsch (b. 1868), with his Wirtschaftliche Eutwicklung der Karolingerzeit (2. vols., 1912-3) and Wirtschaftliche and soziale Grundlagen der europaischen Kulturentwicklung (2 vols., 1918-9); Ludo Moritz Hartmann (b. 1865) with his Geschichte Italiens, etc.

A number of the historians who came from the school of Sickel turned to modern history, under the influence of Ottokar Lorenz (1832-1903). Distinguished among them by his gift for vivid exposition was Heinrich Friedjung (1851-1920), notable for his Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland (2 vols., 11th ed. 1919), Oesterreich, 1848-1860 (2 vols., 4th ed. uncompleted), Das Zeitalter des Inzperialismus, 1884-1914 (vol. i., 1919), Gesammelte Azafsdtze (1919). A rich literary activity was displayed by August Fournier (1850-1920), whose biography of Napoleon (3rd ed., 1913, Eng. trans. 2nd ed. 1911) became widely known even beyond the sphere of the German-speaking public. From the pen of A. F. Pribram there appeared, among other works, the second volume of Die englisch-oesterreichischen Staatsvertrage (1913), and Die geheimen politischen Staatsvertrage Oesterreich-Ungirns 1879-1917 (1920; English trans. by A. C. Coolidge, 1920).

Worthy of note among the younger historians trained at the Institute were Hans Uebersberger (b. 1877), with Russlands Orientpolitik in den letzten Jahrhunderten (vol. i., 1913); H. R. von Srbik (b. 1878), with Wallenstein's Ende (1920); Wilhelm Bauer (b. 1877), with Die Offentliche Meinung auf historischer Grundlage (1917); Viktor Bibl (b. 1870), with Der Tod des Don Carlos (1919); H. Kretschmayer (b. 1870), with his Geschichte Venedigs (2nd vol. 1920). The methodical research into texts inaugurated in Austria by Sickel and Ficker produced valuable fruits in the sphere of German and Austrian legal and constitutional history. Prominent among the workers in this field were Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth (b. 1841); H. von Voltelius (b. 1862) and Siegmund Adler (1813-1920).

Among historians unconnected with the above-mentioned movement, Josef Freiherr von Helfert (1820--1910) was distinguished by a rare devotion to work; a man of great talents, he crowned his life-work by a history in two volumes of the Austrian Revolution of 1848. Ludwig von Pastor (b. 1854) continued his widely read Geschichte der Papste (5th vol., 1920); Eugen Guglia (1855-1918) published a book on Maria Theresa (2 vols., 1917). In the sphere of Slavonic history the unfinished Geschichte Serbiens of J. Jirecek (1857-1918) is also worthy of note. As an economic historian Karl Greenberg (b. 1891) established his reputation during the decade.

The eminent Viennese professor of constitutional law, Josef Redlich (b. 1869), widely known abroad through his masterly works on English local government and English parliamentary procedure, published in 1920 the first volume of Das oesterreichische Staatsand Reichsproblem, a history of the internal policy of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1848 to the break-up of the empire. This first volume brings the account down to 1861.

F. PR.) Foreign Policy, 1909-181 Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in the crucial decade which, through the World War, led to the downfall of the empire, can only be understood by recalling the main historical problem that confronted the old monarchy.

Since the foundation of the German Empire and the kingdom of united Italy an extension of Austria-Hungary towards the S. and W. of Europe had become impossible. Only in the Rivalry S.E. could she still count on an expansion of her k territory and power. Thus from the seventies of the sia in the 19th century onwards the policy of the leading AustroHungarian statesmen had taken the direction indicated by geographical conditions. In this Austria had to reckon with the opposition of Russia, which, with the pressing back of Turkish influence, had become her great rival in S.E. Europe. In order to maintain herself as a Great Power, make her frontier secure against hostile attacks, and suffer no restriction on her further development, she could not allow another Great Power to command the Danube and its mouths, and arrogate to itself the hegemony of the Balkan peoples. This political and economic opposition between the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia was reinforced by opposition of an ethnical and cultural nature. In view of this struggle against a competitor far superior in population and military strength, Austrian statesmen had sought an alliance or understanding with those European states whose interests appeared to run parallel with their own. It was to the benevolent attitude of Germany and England that Austria had owed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the right of maintaining garrisons in the Sanjak of Novibazar - the door to the Near East and the first step towards an expansion of AustriaHungary's sphere of influence in the Balkans, which promised rich prospects, but at the same time an increase in Russian hostility.

From the early eighties of the 19th century Andrassy's successors did indeed try to arrive at a modus vivendi with Russia, and were zealously seconded in this effort by Prince Bismarck, who wished to hold the balance between his two allies. Numerous crises were successfully overcome, but the conflict of interest remained, and was especially heightened after the RussoJapanese War (1904-5) had ended unfavourably for Russia. Russian statesmen renounced the policy, which they had followed for a time, of getting to the "warm ocean" in the Far East, and returned to the one which had been followed by Peter the Great and Catherine and never entirely given up, the goal of which had been the conquest of Constantinople and the command of the Dardanelles. The constantly increasing differences between Germany and the Western Powers, and the advances made by the latter towards friendship with the court of the Tsar, led in 1907-8 to a close entente between Russia and England, and hence to the development of the long-standing alliance between Russia and France into a Triple Entente.

Baron Aehrenthal, who from the autumn of 1906 had directed the foreign policy of the Habsburg Monarchy, recognized the threatening danger, which became greater and Aehren- greater as the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire assumed a more and more critical aspect. This policy. empire he wished to preserve, if it could by any means be done; but in the event of its final liquidation he was firmly determined to safeguard the interests of Austria-Hungary. It was above all necessary to make sure of the possession of the occupied prov e The article under Europe, written from a British historian's point of view, should be read for a somewhat different perspective of the European situation which resulted in the World War. See also Serbia. The account given here naturally reflects, in various aspects, the point of view of an Austrian historian. - (Ed. E. B.) (A.

inces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been under AustroHungarian government for 30 years past. The Young Turk Revolution, in July 1908, served as a pretext for carrying into effect the annexation of these territories, which had been planned long since. It happened opportunely that at this very time Russian statesmen wished to effect the realization of their designs on the Dardanelles. Isvolsky, who directed Russian foreign policy, knew indeed that it would not be easy to win over Great Britain to his plan. But since he believed himself sure of French support, he hoped to achieve at least his immediate aim, the opening of the straits to Russian ships-of-war, so soon as he had come to an understanding with the Central Powers, and especially with Austria-Hungary. During the negotiations entered upon, on Aehrenthal's initiative, between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, Isvolsky expressed his consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of the Vienna Government's falling in with his plans as to the straits question. Aehrenthal seized upon this proposal, for he hoped that the annexation of these provinces would enable him to take active measures in face of the Greater Serbia movement.

At the beginning of July 1908 Isvolsky handed in at Vienna a memorandum which guaranteed to the Habsburg Monarchy, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, the greater part of the Sanjak of Novibazar as well. Aehrenthal accepted Isvolsky's offer in so far as it applied to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but he demanded the same right for the warships of Rumania and Bulgaria as for those of Russia, and in addition a guarantee against an attack on Constantinople by a Russian fleet entering the Bosporus. In return he was ready to give up the Sanjak and the rights appertaining to Austria-Hungary in Montenegro, and therefore the plan of an advance on Salonika, the seizure of which Andrassy had had in view as the next objective in AustriaHungary's policy of expansion in S.E. Europe. On Sept. 15 Aehrenthal met Isvolsky at the château of Buchlau in Moravia, informed him of the impending Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and promised him in return a free hand in his proceedings with regard to the question of the Dardanelles. The two ministers promised each other mutual support; Aehrenthal renounced the Sanjak of Novibazar, as a set-off for which Isvolsky gave a promise that Russia would not take possession of Constantinople. A European conference was to give its sanction to their settlement. A binding written agreement was contemplated, but was not arrived at on this occasion.

When, however, at the beginning of Oct. 1908 Francis Joseph publicly announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a fait accompli, a storm of indignation burst forth in many quarters. It was insisted, especially in England, that agreements settled by international treaties could only be modified with the agreement of all the contracting Powers. Both in Paris and in London, where Isvolsky had betaken himself in order to obtain the consent of the Western Powers to the measures which he had concerted with Aehrenthal, he met with a decided refusal. Disappointed in his expectations, he now declared that he had been led astray by Aehrenthal.

Serbia lodged a protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demanded autonomy for these territories under the guarantee of the Great Powers, and a port on the the Inter- Adriatic for Serbia, with a strip of territory to connect national it with Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary showed no Situation. i ncl i nat i on to take these demands into consideration, Serbia now began to strengthen her military forces. At the same time a violent anti-Austrian movement began to make itself felt in Turkey. All goods coming from Austria-Hungary were boycotted, and Austro-Hungarian traders living in Turkey were subjected to annoyance. Bulgaria, whose prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, had assumed the royal crown on Oct. 5 1908, also took sides against Austria-Hungary. Aehrenthal had made himself personally offensive to that country, which now entered into negotiations with Russia and Serbia. In Italy, too, a hostile tendency towards Austria gained the upper hand. Victor Emanuel III. described the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a stab at the Treaty of Berlin, and Tittoni, who had spoken on Oct. 7 in terms favourable to the annexation, declared in his great speech in the Consulta at the beginning of Dec. 1908 - in contradiction with the tenor of a letter which he had addressed to Aehrenthal on Oct. 4 - that he had entered into no engagements with regard to it. The nationalist press and the irredentists fanned the flames, and in the Austrian Parliament the Sla y s, and above all the Czech leaders, raised loud complaints.

But Aehrenthal remained firm. He was convinced that Russia, which had not yet recovered from the defeat which she had suffered in the Russo-Japanese War, would not draw the sword, and that he would therefore succeed in achieving his ends without bloodshed. His own efforts were directed towards the preservation of peace. In this point of view he was at odds with a powerful party, led by Conrad von Hiitzendorff, chief of the AustroHungarian general staff, which was in favour of a decision by force of arms. In order to meet Russia's views Aehrenthal expressed his consent to the convening of a European conference, but insisted at the same time that he could only promise Serbia and Montenegro economic compensations, and made it a condition that the question of Austria-Hungary's sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be discussed at the conference, but only taken cognizance of by it. Aehrenthal's attitude aroused violent indignation in London and Paris. But since Germany resolutely took its stand on the side of the Habsburg Monarchy, France, with an eye to her Moroccan interests, only gave a lukewarm support to the Russian demands; and Isvolsky found himself compelled to beat a retreat. As early as Dec. 1908 he agreed that the conference should recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after a previous discussion of the matter had taken place between the several Cabinets. Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey, the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, advised the Turkish Government to give their consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be bought by a proportionate cash indemnity. Aehrenthal fell in with a suggestion in these terms, and on Feb. 26 1909 concluded an agreement with Turkey which secured to the Sultan, in return for his recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, a considerable sum of money in compensation for Ottoman State property in the annexed provinces. the course of the month of March the negotiations as to the form of consent to the annexation to be given by the Great Powers concerned were brought to a conclusion. It was to be effected by official declarations on their part, a European conference being avoided. On March 24 declarations in this sense were handed in at Berlin and Vienna by the Russian Government; those of England followed on March 28.

The danger of an Austro-Serbian war, which for some time had appeared inevitable, had fortunately passed by. Even after the settlement of the Austro-Turkish conflict the Serbs remained stubborn; Aehrenthal, however, wanted to avoid war, and now, as before, hoped to reach his goal Attitude of > > > P g Serbia. by calm firmness and conciliation. At the beginning of March 1909 he declared that Serbia, in order to avoid the humiliation of having her fate settled by the statesmen of Vienna, might submit to the decision of the Great Powers. But the Serbian Government declined, and continued to arm. The Cabinet of Vienna then decreed that the troops in the S.E. of the Monarchy should be reinforced. Isvolsky now saw that Francis Joseph was in earnest. Since he could not venture on war, he accepted the proposal of the German Imperial Chancellor, Billow, that Russia herself should use her influence over Serbia in the direction of moderation. On Great Britain's initiative negotiations were entered upon with the Government of Vienna, which led to the drafting of a note which should secure to AustriaHungary the satisfaction which she demanded.

After overcoming great difficulties it was possible to effect an agreement. On March 31 the Serbian Government handed in a note at Vienna in which it declared that Serbia had Submis- not suffered any injury to her rights through the sion of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- Serbia. Hungary, and promised to change the attitude which she had hitherto taken towards the Habsburg Monarchy, to maintain good neighbourly relations with the monarchy, and to reduce her army to the footing of the previous year (1908). In so doing Serbia submitted to the behest of the signatory Powers, but at the same time to the will of Austria-Hungary. Montenegro thereupon followed suit. The event was a victory for Aehrenthal, but a pyrrhic victory, in that through it was effected the cleavage of Europe into two hostile camps. Russia now broke definitely with Austria-Hungary and became increasingly hostile to German policy, while England recognized with increasing clearness the significance of the Southern Sla y s in the struggle against Germany, and especially of Serbia as a battering-ram against Germany's ally, the Habsburg Monarchy.

Two other events led to a further strengthening of the Triple Entente. One was the rapprochement between Russia and Italy, made manifest by Nicholas II.'s visit to Racconigi Triple En- (Oct. 24 1909); the other was the secret treaty con cluded in Dec. 1 o between Russia and Bulgaria, 9 9 g which ranged the latter in the Russian sphere of influence, and contained among other things the declaration that the realization of the ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan peninsula would only be possible after a favourable outcome of Russia's contest with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Yet at this time these opposing tendencies did not come out into the open. The Central Powers sought rather to overcome 4 them. At the beginning of the year 1910 negotiations took place with Russia which were intended to further the establishment of better relations. After hopeful preliminaries they split on the irreconcilability of their conflicting interests. Aehrenthal's efforts at Rome seemed to meet with more success. He was able at the end of 1909 to arrive at an agreement with the Italian statesmen on the Albanian question, by which further friction between the two states, who were rivals in this quarter, should be avoided. In subsequent conversations which he held on frequent occasions in 1910 with the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, measures were considered which should smooth the way towards the establishment of friendly relations between the Cabinets of Vienna and Rome. In the years 1910 and 1911, moreover, Aehrenthal was eagerly striving to do everything for the maintenance of peace. He endeavoured to reconcile the differences which were forever cropping up anew between England and Germany. In order to win over Rumania and conciliate Serbia, commercial treaties were concluded with them. In the interest of peace, too, he placed no obstacle in the way of the assumption of the royal style by the Prince of Montenegro (Aug. 29 1910). Yet Aehrenthal kept his aim steadfastly in view: namely, the upholding of Austria-Hungary's interests in the Near East; and he left the Balkan peoples in no doubt that he would not be a peaceful spectator of the downfall of Turkey. He was in a difficult position when, in the autumn of 1911, Italy seized the opportunity for taking possession of Tripoli. A strong party, headed by the chief of the general staff, Conrad von HOtzendorff, held that the moment had arrived for coming to a reckoning with their faithless ally. In any case they wanted to use this favourable opportunity for assuring to Austria-Hungary the hegemony of the Balkans. But Aehrenthal, supported by Francis Joseph, stood up for the maintenance of the Triple Alliance. He even held that it was in the interest of the Habsburg Monarchy that Italy's imperialistic aspirations should find satisfaction on the south of the Mediterranean. He therefore asked Italy, in leaving her a free hand in Tripoli, not to interfere with the designs of the Vienna Cabinet in the Balkan peninsula. Also he requested the withdrawal of the Italian fleet from the coast of Albania, and protested against Italian designs on Salonika.

The fact that Aehrenthal gained his ends by these demands confirmed him in the idea that he had hit upon the right way, and increased his hopes of being able to guard Austria-. thal Suc- Hungary's interests in this difficult crisis without by resorting to arms. Aehrenthal 's death (Feb. 17 1912) was therefore a heavy loss to the Habsburg Monarchy, which made itself all the more felt since just at that time new dangers were arising for it in S.E. Europe. His successor as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister was Count Leopold Berchtold, who had formerly been ambassador at St. Petersburg.

The Italo-Turkish War, and especially the closing of the Dardanelles at the instance of the Turks, had done severe harm to Russian trade, and increased the desire of Russian statesmen to gain command of the Black Sea. It was widely held, too, that this was a favourable opportunity to bring about a Balkan alliance under Russian leader ship, which should make it possible for Russia, as protector of the Slav peoples of the Balkans, to take possession of Constantinople. Hartwig, the Russian minister in Belgrade, was particularly active in this direction. Other circles, led by Charykov, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, thought it possible to attain the same end by other means. They wanted to preserve Turkey, but to make her Russia's vassal. She was to be admitted to the Balkan alliance and, in return, to allow the Russian fleet a free exit to the Mediterranean. But Charykov's efforts failed. Turkey refused; and in March 1912 Charykov had to leave Constantinople. The old plan of forming a Balkan alliance against Turkey was now taken up again. The greatest difficulty in its way was the jealousy between the Bulgarians, on the one hand, and the Serbs and Greeks on the other. Bulgaria would not hear of conceding to these peoples the extensions of territory which they claimed in Macedonia. It was not till March 1912, when the Russophil Gueshoff-Daneff Cabinet came into power in Sofia, that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was concluded, which was indeed aimed in the first place against Turkey, but also had the Habsburg Monarchy in view. Two military conventions (of May 12 and July 12 1912) further developed this Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Bulgaria now undertook, in case Austria-Hungary occupied the Sanjak of Novibazar, to contribute 250,000 men towards a war with this Power. On May 29 Ferdinand of Bulgaria concluded a treaty with Greece against Turkey. But at the same time he handed in peaceful declarations at Vienna, Berlin and Constantinople, and let himself be feted in Vienna as a friend of the Habsburg Monarchy.

At the beginning of July 1912 the Tsar Nicholas II., at his meeting with the German Emperor at Baltiski Port (Port Baltic), in Esthonia, laid stress upon his pacific intentions. But as early as Aug. there began the longprepared conflict of the Christian peoples of the Balkans with Turkey, leading to bloody local struggles, in which there was no lack of atrocities on either side. In vain did the Central Powers endeavour to bring about an intervention of the Great Powers of Europe. On Sept. 30 1912 the order for mobilization was issued in Sofia, Belgrade and Athens. In order to have her hands free in this direction, Turkey thereupon determined to bring to an end the war against Italy by sacrificing Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and on Oct. 18 1912 the treaty of peace was signed at Lausanne. In the meantime the Balkan States had completed the last preparations for war. On Oct. 8 Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and soon after, on Oct. 17 and 18, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece did likewise. To the astonishment of the European Great Powers they gained decisive victories over their opponent from the outset. The battle of Kirk Kilisse (Oct. 22) went in favour of the Bulgars, that of Kumanovo (Oct. 26) in favour of the Serbs. The Turkish troops, falling back rapidly, did indeed defend themselves successfully on the Chatalja lines against the oncoming Bulgarians, and thereby saved their threatened capital. But since none of the Great Powers would take active measures in their favour, they could not hope to reconquer the lost provinces. On Dec. 3 1912 an armistice was concluded between Turkey and Serbia, and between Turkey and Bulgaria. Greece took no part in it, but continued the struggle.

The success of the Balkan States against Turkey meant a marked weakening of the prestige of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. The entry of the Greeks into Salonika (Nov. 8 1912) and the advance of the Serbian troops to the Adriatic produced a particularly painful im pression in Vienna. But consideration for the Slav Policy. peoples of the monarchy, who hailed with joy the victory of the Christian states of the Balkans over Turkey, and the dread of incurring the open enmity of Russia by an energetic intervention on behalf of the Sultan, held the Vienna Government back and disposed it, as early as the end of Oct. 1912, to modify its demands. Albania was to be allowed to develop freely; Serbian aspirations towards the Adriatic were to be rejected, and Rumania's claims to an extension of territory to be considered. Berchtold demanded no more than security for Austro-Hungarian economic interests in the Balkans. On this account he refused in the most decided terms to consent to the proposal of the French Government that Austria-Hungary, like all the other Great Powers, should express her desinteressement in the events taking place in the Balkan peninsula.

In so far as his plans concerned Albania and Serbia, Berchtold found Italian politicians in favour of them, since they saw in the spread of the Slav peoples to the Adriatic a danger to Italy, to oppose which in good time seemed to them Triple more important than any further check to the influence of the Habsburg Monarchy, divided as this was against itself. The common danger brought about a rapprochement between the two Cabinets, which was considerably strengthened by Italy's annoyance at the attitude of France at the time of the Libyan War. Thus it happened that as far back as Dec. 5 1912, in spite of violent opposition on the part of the nationalist deputies, of the more important section of the press, and of Italian public opinion, the Triple Alliance was renewed once more for another six to twelve years, the period being reckoned from 1914 onwards.

But the moderation displayed by Austria-Hungary in her Balkan policy did not produce the effect which had been hoped for at the Ballplatz. It weakened rather her credit

n the Balkans, disappointed the few partisans she had there, and encouraged the hopes of her many opponents. Paying no attention to Berchtold's declarations, the Serbs continued their efforts to extend their power to the Adriatic. On Nov. 10 1912 Serbian troops reached Alessio. At the same time Serbian politicians laboured to incite the other Balkan peoples against Austria-Hungary, since it was only at her expense they could hope to find compensation for the concessions which they had made in the March treaty with Bulgaria. In St. Petersburg, too, they left no stone unturned to create opinion against Austria-Hungary. And, in fact, in Nov. 1912 the Russian Cabinet declared itself in favour of the cession of an Adriatic port to Serbia, and was supported in this by France and England. The Russian trial mobilization increased the danger of a bloody collision. The Vienna Government on its side proceeded to prepare for war. The fact that Conrad von Hotzendorff was again entrusted with the position of chief of the general staff, which he had had to give up a year before because he had spoken in favour of an active military policy, showed that the war party had increased its influence at the Court of Vienna.

But the disinclination of the three emperors to conjure up a world war for the sake of Albania or Serbia, together with the influence of Great Britain, proved stronger than the urgency of the war parties either in Vienna or St. Petersburg. In opposition to Austria-Hungary, Bethmann Hollweg, the German imperial chancellor, and Kiderlen-Wachter, the German foreign minister, energetically upheld the point of view that a compromise with Russia was both desirable and possible. And in a like sense William II., when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand tried to convince him at Springe (Nov. 23 1912) of the necessity of an energetic course of action against the demands of the Serbs, insisted that, while he was in favour of using firm language, he was anxious to see all steps avoided which might lead to a rupture with Russia. In order that no doubt should arise as to the policy of the German Empire, Bethmann Hollweg, in announcing in the German Reichstag (at the beginning of Dec. 1912) the successful renewal of the Triple Alliance, added the remark that Germany must leave it to her Austrian ally to realize her aspirations alone, and would only join in a conflict in the case of a war of aggression against her, for the preservation of her own position in Europe and the defence of her own future and security.

Under the impression of these declarations Berchtold at the end of 1912 rejected Conrad's propositions, which aimed at the occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar and ridding - Albania of Serbian troops, and he sought rather to serve the interests of the monarchy by diplomacy. In this connexion it stood him in good stead that a change had meanwhile come over affairs at the Court of St. Petersburg, not uninfluenced by external factors, and especially by England. The peace party had gained the upper hand. As late as Nov. 191 2 the Russian Government made a communication at Belgrade to the effect that it would offer no active opposition to the formation of an autonomous Albania, and requesting an attitude of reserve towards Austria-Hungary on the part of the Serbian Cabinet. Shortly afterwards, on the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, a conference of ambassadors in London was decided upon, to take place at the same time as the peace negotiations which were being carried on there between Turkey and her opponents, with a view to finding a solution of the outstanding questions at issue between Russia and Austria-Hungary. After long hesitation Berchtold, under pressure from Germany and Italy, consented to the conference of ambassadors, but insisted that as a matter of principle Austria-Hungary should take no part in any discussion of the question as to whether Serbia should be permanently established on the Adriatic. Serbia thereupon declared her willingness to yield to the decision of the Great Powers. Yet the Austro-Hungarian and Russian troops remained under arms, and Serbian intrigues still went on. The negotiations of the London conference of ambassadors proceeded slowly. When the peace conference, which was sitting at the same time, came temporarily to an end on Jan. 7 1913, owing to Turkey's refusal of the demand of the Balkan States that she should cede the three fortresses of Adrianople, Scutari and Janina, which had not yet fallen, the conference of ambassadors presided over by Sir Edward Grey made efforts to prevent a resumption of hostilities; but these attempts were unsuccessful. On Feb. 3 1913 began the second Balkan War.

Meanwhile the deliberations dragged on in London as to the frontier of the new Albanian state which was to be set up. Russia in this matter presented the views of Serbia Austro- and Montenegro, but met with resolute opposition not only from the representatives of Austria-Hungary War but also from those of Italy. And it looked at last as if it would come to an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia. But at the last moment the danger was averted. Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe was sent on a special mission to St. Petersburg and succeeded in convincing Nicholas II. of Francis Joseph's pacific intentions. The negotiations now opened led in March to the cancelling of the mobilization on the frontiers which had been set on foot by both Powers. At the same time the Russian representative at the London conference of ambassadors announced his sovereign's readiness to consent to the allotment of Scutari to Albania in the event of AustriaHungary's acceding to the separation of Diakova, Ipek (Pee) and Prisren from Albania. On March 20 the representative of Austria-Hungary handed in a declaration in the same sense.

By now the war between the Balkan States and Turkey had taken its course, leading, in spite of the unexpectedly gallant defence of the Turks, to the fall of Janina (March 6) and Adrianople (March 26). On account of the wrangling which broke out between Bulgaria on the War81 one hand, and Serbia and Greece on the other, as to the partition of Macedonia, on April 16 1913 Ferdinand of Bulgaria concluded an armistice with Turkey. But there was no sign of the peace which was desired on all sides. Serbia, in defiance of the protests of the Vienna Cabinet, continued to occupy Northern Albania with Durazzo, and Montenegro continued to besiege Scutari, although the London conference of ambassadors had assigned it to the Albanian state; and the Great Powers decided on a naval demonstration against Montenegro, which was not, however, intended seriously by all the participants. The war party at Vienna, led by Conrad, wished to force the Montenegrins to raise the siege, if necessary by arms, Austria Hungary ' 'and Rumania. Effect of the Balkan Wars. Doubtful Attitude Rumania. rap- Policy of Austria= Hungary. ' 'and Be' e and Berlin. The" for ' Agree - meat. me'moire views in a second memorandum of July 8 and counselled moderation, laying stress on the danger of international complications. This view should have been reinforced by the report drawn up by Friedrich von Wiesner (b. 1871), who had been sent by the Vienna Ballplatz to Sarajevo, on the circumstances in which the murderous attack on the heir to the throne had taken place. This report established the fact that no direct connexion could be proved between the murderer and the Serbian Government. But this report failed of its effect. Authoritative circles in Vienna remained under the conviction that the Court and Government of Belgrade had for long lent their benevolent support to the Greater Serbian movement, and held to their determination of putting atr end to an unbearable situation. The dangers which might arise from drastic measures were indeed weighed; the possibility of a world war was even considered. But the opinion predominated that all must be staked on one card. " Better an end by fear than fear without end," ("Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken, als ein Schrecken ohne Ende") was the mot of a leading statesman. These circles were confirmed in their resolve to appeal to arms by the pronouncements of Conrad von Hdtzendorff, who, in reply to a question, summed up his judgment in the following sense: that the military prospects of the Central Powers in a world war (Great Britain's intervention on the side of the enemy not being yet reckoned with seriously) were no longer so favourable as in previous years, but were certainly more favourable than they would be in the near future. That decided it. On July 14 the decision was adopted of sending Serbia an ultimatum with a short timelimit. Tisza, after long vacillation, acquiesced, but with the condition that Austria-Hungary was to make a solemn declaration that - with the exception of necessary minor rectifications of the frontier - she sought no territorial gains at the expense of Serbia. By this means Tisza hoped to placate Russia and to deprive the Italians of any pretext for advancing any claim to compensations under Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. This request of Tisza's was indeed taken into account at the conference of ministers of July 19, but on the same occasion Berchtold declared that Serbia was,to be made smaller and the provinces taken from her were to be divided among some of the other Balkan States.

The note to Serbia, which had not found its final form till after repeated modification of its language,' was read out, and the time for its presentation to the Serbian Government appointed for the afternoon of July 23.

Its essential points ran as follows: - Since the Greater Serbian movement directed against Austria-Hungary has been proceeded with in recent years with the ultimate object of separating from the Habsburg Monarchy certain of its parts; and since the Serbian Government, in contradiction with the declarations handed in by it on March 31 1909, has not only done nothing towards its suppression, but has rather encouraged it, the Austro-Hungarian Government must formulate certain demands in order to put an end to this state of affairs. In these demands are included, amongst others, the condemnation of agitation having as its object the breaking away of portions of the monarchy and the admonition of the peoples against a continuance of this course: both to be accomplished through an announcement in the official press organ and through an army order on the part of the king; the suppression of the Greater Serbian agitation on Serbian soil; the dissolution of societies working for this object; the dismissal of the officials and teachers compromised; the participation of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the measures which the Serbian Government should be under the obligation to undertake with a view to the suppression of the Greater Serbian movement.

The presentation of the note took place at the appointed time; on July 24 the world was informed of its contents. Only Germany approved unreservedly the demarche of the Vienna Government; the remaining Powers raised objections. Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, broke into a violent outburst against Austria-Hungary, and declared. it to be a matter of international concern. Sir E. Grey described the note as " the 1 A prominent part in the drafting of the ultimatum was played by Count Johann Forgach (b. 1870) and Baron Alexander Musulin (h. 1866), who had also, as Berchtold's advisers, a decisive influence on the course of events generally at this time.

most formidable document " that one State had ever addressed to another. Negotiations began at once between the groups of Powers. They aimed at the extension of the time-limit of 48 hours which had been allowed to the Serbs. England and Russia were especially active in this sense. But Austria-Hungary refused any prolongation of the time-limit. On July 25, shortly before the expiry of the appointed interval, the Serbs handed in their answer. They declared themselves ready to comply with the majority of the demands of the Vienna Government, but with regard to certain points - for instance, where it was a question of the participation of the Austro-Hungarian representatives in the judicial enquiry to be held in the territory of the kingdom of Serbia, and of the dismissal of the officers and officials who were compromised - certain reservations were made; at the same time the Serbs emphasized their willingness to endeavour to reach a friendly solution of the conflict by referring the decision to the Hague Court of Arbitration, or to those Great Powers who had collaborated in the composition of the Serbian declaration of March 31 1909. But the AustroHungarian minister declared Serbia's answer to be unsatisfactory, and diplomatic relations were broken off between Vienna and Belgrade.

The Vienna Cabinet's harsh attitude nowhere met with approbation; the German Government itself did not approve it. The Emperor William indeed was of opinion that Austria-Hungary had gained a great moral victory, to g Y g g Y? Avert and that no cause of war remained. But neither his efforts, nor those of Sir Edward Grey, which were directed towards the mediation of the Great Powers not directly involved, met with success. On July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The Great Powers now strove to localize the conflict. But all their attempts came to naught. Even the English proposal for direct negotiations with a view to an understanding between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg led to no result. On the evening of July 29 the order was given for mobilization in the military area on the S.W. front of Russia situated on the border of Austria-Hungary. On July 31 the Russian order for a general mobilization was issued, and answered by similar measures on the part of Austria-Hungary and Germany. On Aug. 2 Germany declared war on Russia, and the day after on France; on Aug. 4 England and Belgium on Germany; on the 6th Austria-Hungary on Russia; other Powers followed suit. The World War, so long dreaded by the Great Powers of Europe, had broken out.

The Central Powers had now to make sure of the aid of their allies and to win new combatants to their side. But the efforts which they made towards this end brought them disappointment upon disappointment. The conversations which had taken place with Italy in July 1914 had made them realize that they could not reckon on an immediate participation of the Italian troops on the side of the Triple Alliance. As early as July 25, moreover, San Giuliano had announced that he would open the question of compensation for Italy in case of an Austro-Serbian war. This announcement he "repeated after the declaration of war, but made it clear at the same time that Austria-Hungary was not to expect active support from the Italians, since she had taken the offensive against Serbia. Under pressure from the German Government, which still cherished the hope of deciding Italy, by farreaching concessions, to take part in a world war on the side of the Central Powers, Berchtold declared himself ready in principle to recognize the Italian claims to compensation for every annexation made by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but in any case only on the assumption that Italy would observe a friendly attitude towards the Habsburg Monarchy in an AustroSerbian war, and in case of a world war fulfil her obligations as a member of the Triple Alliance. But as early as Aug. i San Giuliano insisted that the cases foederis had not arisen for Italy in the case of the Russians also; for the time being she would remain neutral; but cooperation with her allies at a later time was referred to as not excluded. It was in the same sense, though in the most cordial terms possible, that Victor Emmanuel answered the telegram in which Francis Joseph expressed his expectation of seeing the Italian troops fighting side by side with those of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Still less gratifying to Vienna were the reports which came in at the same time from Bucharest. The hopes which the Emperor William had built on King Charles's faith Attitude of f u lness to his treaty obligations were not realized. Rumania. Y g The Rumanian ruler evaded a decisive pronouncement as to his attitude in a world war; and Bratianu, the minister-president, did likewise. Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian minister at Bucharest, maintained that at first nothing but neutrality could be reckoned on on the part of Rumania, and insisted that the attitude of the Bulgarians and Turks, together with the course taken by the events of the war, would be decisive for any further action of the King and Government. It was significant that Bratianu spoke of the necessity of maintaining a balance in the Balkans, and at the same time pointed out the difficulties which would confront the King and the Government in consequence of the hostile attitude of influential Rumanian circles to the Magyars. It was in vain that Francis Joseph and William II. used their personal influence to try and persuade King Charles to take action in the sense they wished. No effect was produced even by the promise made by them to the King on Aug. 2 1914 that they would help Rumania to obtain possession of Bessarabia, after the war had come to a successful end, if she would join in the struggle on the side of the Triple Alliance Powers. The crown council held on Aug. 4 decided that Rumania could not admit that the casus foederis had arisen. The assurance given by Charles at the same time, that he would safeguard the Rumanian frontiers and apprise Bulgaria that she would have nothing to fear from Rumania if 'she ranged herself with the Central Powers, could be of no greater comfort to his disillusioned allies than his solemn declaration that he would never consent to Rumania taking the field against Austria-Hungary.

The Central Powers were rather more fortunate in their quest for new allies than in their attempts to persuade Italy and Rumania to fulfil their engagements. On Aug. r 1914 the representatives of Germany and Turkey Tith h ad signed a treaty by which they bound themselves to Turkey. g Y Y Y remain neutral in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; but the casus foederis would arise at the moment when Russia entered the war. In this event Germany promised Turkey military support, and guaranteed her existing territorial position as against the Russians. By identical .notes of Aug. i 1914 Austria-Hungary adhered to this treaty, which was to last till the end of 1918. But for the time being the Turks did not actively intervene, for their army was not yet properly equipped, and the influence of the friends of the Entente at Constantinople was still too strong. In order to strengthen the Government, which was friendly to the Central Powers, and to make it possible for them shortly to take an active part against the Entente, Germany promised them, as early as the first weeks of Aug. 1914, though only verbally, that in the event of a complete victory of Germany and her allies, their wishes should be furthered both in the matter of the abolition of the Capitulations and of final settlement with Bulgaria; that all Turkish provinces which might be occupied by the common enemy in the course of the war should be evacuated; a series of rectifications of the frontier to her advantage would be made, and they would receive a proportionate share in the war indemnity which was to be expected. Direct inquiries from the Turks were met by Berchtold with the same promises in the name of Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, the efforts of the Central Powers to decide Bulgaria to an alliance broke down. At first, indeed, it looked as if the negotiations which had already Negotia- been conducted by Austria-Hungary at Sofia for a long time in this sense would speedily lead to a profitable result. Austria-Hungary showed herself inclined, in return for Bulgaria's adhesion to the Triple Alliance, to guarantee her existing territorial possessions, and, in the event of a favourable outcome of the impending conflicts, to gratify Ferdinand's aspirations towards the acquisition of " ethnicohistorical boundaries" against states which had not joined the Triple Alliance. By the early days of Aug. 1914 the negotiations had advanced so far that the signature of the treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary seemed imminent. Berchtold and Bethmann Hollweg pressed for a decision, the latter more especially on the ground that he still hoped to win over Rumania definitely to the side of the Central Powers. If this could be achieved, then Bulgaria, assured against attacks from the Rumanian side, might be prompted to draw the sword against Serbia, and the majority of the Austro-Hungarian troops which were marching against Serbia could be diverted against Russia. But Ferdinand of Bulgaria refused to embark on a war against Serbia. He laid stress on the dangers which threatened his kingdom in such a case from Greece, Rumania and Turkey; he also alluded to the large offers which had been made him by Russia, and held that he could only come to a decision after his relations with Rumania and Turkey had been cleared up and the negotiations for a treaty with these Powers had been concluded. It was clear that Ferdinand of Bulgaria, too, did not wish to enter the war before the preponderance of the Central Powers over their opponents could be assumed with greater confidence. But successes in the field remained to seek in the Eastern theatre of war. After promising beginnings, the campaign of the Austro-Hungarian armies took an unsuccessful turn, and decided Ferdinand to be prudent. He declared that he would remain neutral, but for the present he could do no more.

But the ill success of the Austro-Hungarian armies did not produce an effect on the Bulgarian Government only. With the advance of the Russians and their approach to the Rumanian frontiers, the influence of the friends of the Entente at Bucharest increased. The news arriving at Berlin and Vienna at this time caused the worst to be feared. It was believed that an overthrow of the dynasty was imminent, together with an immediate alliance of Rumania with the enemy, and an advance of Rumanian troops into Transylvania. The most pressing advice reached Vienna from Berlin in favour of far-reaching concessions, even of a territorial nature. But, strongly influenced by Tisza, Berchtold refused any concessions in this direction. Under the advice of King Charles, who was already seriously ill, and was torn by a terrible conflict between personal honour and the wishes of his people, the Central Powers sought to work upon public opinion in Bucharest by a declaration that the defection of Rumania would be met by an immediate advance of troops into the country. But their threats remained ineffectual, for it was known in Bucharest that the troops necessary for such an enterprise were not forthcoming. In reality Germany was counselling Vienna not to oppose the march of Rumanian troops into Transylvania by force of arms, since for the moment a defence of the frontiers was impossible; but rather to tolerate the advance, and to announce that it had taken place in order to defend the territory from occupation by Russian troops. Berchtold refused, and Tisza, whose acrimony over the German proposals knew no bounds, declared that he would rather see the Russians than the Rumanians in Transylvania. Meanwhile the tide of warlike enthusiasm at Bucharest mounted higher and higher. The Government entered into a written agreement with Italy providing for common action on the part of both of them. A crown council was summoned for the early days of Oct., which was to come to a decision against the Central Powers. Only at the last moment was it possible to avert the danger. The crown council was cancelled, and Rumania for the time being remained neutral. A few days later, on Oct. ro 1914, King Charles of Rumania died. He had not fulfilled the engagements into which he had entered, but he had at least successfully prevented his troops from fighting against the Central Powers.

One of the chief reasons which had delayed the Rumanians in going over to the camp of the Entente was the fear enter Bulgaria. sacro egoismo, rapprochement In Equivocal Attitude o 2 21 with ing their enemies, as in that case she would have to reckon with Bulgaria, which had not forgiven the wounds inflicted by the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913.

It was not an easy matter for the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to win over the Bulgarians. Both the King and Radoslavov distrusted the Rumanians and Turks, and feared the Greeks and Russians. Moreover, the far-reaching offers of the Entente Powers were not without influence upon them. Their attitude in their dealings with the representatives of the Central Powers was guarded, and they kept increasing their demands. As early as the end of 1914 the Vienna Government, in view of the unfavourable military position in Serbia and Galicia, and in consequence of the pressure exerted upon it not only by the German politicians and military commanders, but also by Conrad, had declared its readiness to concede to the Bulgarians, in the event of their entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the possession of those Serbian territories to which they advanced historical and ethnographical claims; only, however, so far as they should occupy them with their own troops during the course of the war. The negotiations started at the beginning of 1915 on this basis were protracted by the Bulgarians, for in view of the unfavourable military situation of the Central Powers at the time, King Ferdinand and Radoslavov did not think it expedient to enter into permanent engagements. They therefore declared that they could promise only to remain neutral, but demanded in return considerable extensions of territory in Macedonia, increasing their claims in March and April under the impression of the Russian victories in the Carpathians and the danger threatening Turkey from the Western Powers. Burian, however, held firmly to the position that he could make territorial concessions only in return for active participation on Bulgaria's part. The breakthrough at Gorlitz and the subsequent victorious advance of the Germans and Austro-Hungarian troops also produced their effect in Sofia. The negotiations with the Central Powers were carried on with more zeal; but they failed to reach a settlement, since the demands of the Bulgarians continued to be out of all proportion to any services which they seemed disposed to offer in return. They declined to attack Serbia, refused a military convention proposed to them by the Central Powers, but at the same time increased the price of their continued neutrality. The entry of Italy into the war against the Central Powers, and the increasingly extensive offers on the part of the Entente, added to the difficulty of the negotiations between Vienna and Sofia. But gradually the conviction gained ground in Sofia that adherence to the Central Powers would serve the interests of Bulgaria better than an alliance with the Entente. For it would be easy for the former to concede the extensions of territory desired by Bulgaria in Macedonia at Serbia's expense, whereas the Entente Powers were bound to fear that similar concessions on their part would give offence to their faithful ally Serbia. The Triple Entente failed in their efforts to persuade the Serbs to consent to this sacrifice by promising them, in the event of ultimate victory, the possession of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, for Bulgaria demanded immediate possession of the Macedonian territories promised her, while Serbia wanted the transfer of these territories to be postponed until she herself should have secured the extension of territory promised to her by way of compensation.

It was only when the continued victorious advance of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in Poland made the prospects of the ultimate victory of the Central Powers in the World War seem very favourable, that the advantage to be gained by joining them was definitely recognized at Sofia. From July 1915 onwards negotiations were energetically carried on. The Central Powers insisted on the signature of a military convention in addition, to the treaty of alliance, and that Bulgaria should at the same time conclude a treaty with the Turks. After innumerable difficulties had been surmounted, the treaties between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria were signed on Sept. 6 1915. The most important article of one treaty contained a guarantee by Austria-Hungary of the independence and integrity of Bulgaria against any attack not provoked by Bulgaria herself, this guarantee to be valid for the duration of the alliance, i.e. till Dec. 31 1920, and after that for a year, and so on until the treaty should be denounced in proper form. Bulgaria, for her part, undertook to give AustriaHungary proportionate armed assistance in the event of the monarchy being attacked by a State bordering on Bulgaria, and demanding her aid. The second agreement, signed on the same day, contained a pledge from Bulgaria that she would take the offensive against Serbia, in return for which what is now Serbian Macedonia - the so-called "disputed" and "nondisputed" zones, as established by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of March 13 1912 - was promised to her. In the meantime it was agreed that, in the event of an attack by Rumania on Bulgaria or her allies - including the Turks - which should not have been provoked by Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary would consent to the recovery by Bulgaria of the territory ceded by her to Rumania by the Peace of Bucharest, and a rectification of the Rumano-Bulgarian frontier as defined by the Treaty of Berlin. A similar promise was made to Bulgaria, under the same conditions, with regard to the territory ceded by her to Greece by the Peace of Bucharest. The military convention signed on the same day settled the provisions for the carryingout of the impending joint offensive against Serbia. The negotiations between the Turks and Bulgarians, which had been going on for a year past, were also brought to a conclusion on Sept. 6, thanks to persistent pressure from the Central Powers. Turkey gave in on the essential point by agreeing to a rectification of the frontier in favour of Bulgaria on both banks of the Maritsa.

The significance of the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers lay in the facts that it secured their communications with Turkey, and also the possibility of a victorious campaign against Serbia. The campaign now began and proceeded according to programme. Though valiantly defended by the Serbs against overwhelming numbers, their country fell, towards the end of 1915, into the hands of the Central Powers and Bulgaria. Shortly afterwards Montenegro shared the same fate.

The year 1915 also brought " Congress Poland " into the possession of the Central Powers. After the fall of Warsaw (Aug. 5 1915) General Governments were set up on behalf of Germany at Warsaw and on behalf of Austria-Hungary at Lublin, to which all governmental powers were handed over. At first the Central Powers had not contemplated the permanent acquisition of " Congress Poland." It was merely considered as a pawn and an item for compensations at the end of the war. But after the fall of Warsaw, the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin tried to arrive at an agreement as to the future destiny of Poland. The most diverse solutions were discussed, but no definitive agreement was arrived at by the end of the war. The idea of handing Poland back to Russia was indeed repeatedly advanced by Germany - both in the year 1915 and again very actively after July 1916 - when Stiirmer was at the head of foreign affairs in the empire of the Tsar. But since the condition of such a solution - namely a total separation of Russia from the Entente - could not be brought about, it was allowed to drop. The plan of dividing the whole of the conquered territory of Poland between AustriaHungary and Germany was also considered. But insuperable difficulties arose in the course of the negotiations, particularly with regard to the frontiers of the respective territories. It was also foreseen that the Poles would not voluntarily submit to a new partition of their country and that they would struggle for its reunion. It was feared, moreover, that far-reaching differences between the Allies would be revealed the moment economic and military questions should come under discussion. The idea of annexing " Congress Poland " to Germany, first ventilated by a section of public opinion and in military circles in Germany, was rejected not only by the Vienna Cabinet but also by the German Imperial Chancellor, since he feared the increase of Polish influence in Germany that would be bound to follow. The plan advocated for a time by Bethmann Hollweg, of founding an independent Polish buffer state, which should be in economic, political and military alliance with the Central Powers, also split upon the opposition of the Vienna Government. Thus the union of " Congress Poland " with the Habsburg Monarchy, which Burian had proposed in Aug. 1915, and which had been advocated by the writings of Count Andrassy among others, stood out more clearly as the only possible solution of the Polish question. But this, too, presented great difficulties on closer examination. There were adherents of the idea of a personal union and on the other hand of an actual union; among the latter were those who were in favour of a trialistic form for the new greater Austria-Hungary, and those who advocated the incorporation of Poland in the Austrian State.

Under the influence of the Hungarian Government, whose spokesman, Count Tisza, protested in the strongest terms against the organization of the monarchy on a trialistic basis, the idea now prevailed of annexing Poland to Austria-Hungary and granting to the united territory of Poland, with the addition of Galicia, a far-reaching autonomy. This had the further object of diminishing the damage to the interests of the GermanAustrians which was feared by wide circles in Austria and Germany. Since the autumn of 1915 negotiations were carried on between leading statesmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary on this basis. But the more deeply the question was gone into the greater were the difficulties which presented themselves. Bethmann Hollweg declared that the German people could only agree to such a strengthening of Austria-Hungary in the event of the German Empire coming out of the war with an equally large increase of territory. Economic and military objections were also advanced on the German side, and as a solution it was proposed to incorporate a small portion of " Congress Poland " with Austrian Galicia, and out of the greater part of the rest to create a Polish State independent in form but in reality under the protectorate of Germany. But this proposal was firmly rejected by the Vienna Government, which for its part advanced the idea of a genuinely autonomous State comprising the whole of Polish territory, which should be allied by a long-term economic and military agreement with both the Central Powers equally. But it was impossible to win the consent of the Berlin Government to this plan.

Such was the position when the Austro-Hungarian troops were defeated at Lutsk. The result of this was that in Aug. 1916 the Germans carried the day with their proposal to found an independent State, practically comprising the former " Congress Poland" under a hereditary constitutional monarchy, but subject to the most far-reaching limitations in military and economic matters. On the Austro-Hungarian side the bestowal of the crown of Poland on a member of the family of Habsburg-Lorraine was waived. A more exact definition of the sphere of influence of the Central Powers was reserved for further discussion. But their subsequent course showed that the opposition of interests was too deep-seated for it to be possible to settle matters in a hurry. In Oct. 1916, therefore, they came to an agreement for the present to shelve the question of an independent Polish State. But in order to calm the Poles, who were anxious about their fate, and to secure the assistance of their armed forces for the Central Powers, a proclamation was issued on Nov. 5 1916, in which a prospect was held out of the restoration of an independent Poland as a hereditary constitutional monarchy closely attached to the Central Powers. But the two military governments at Warsaw and Lublin continued to administer the country.

Even before this agreement had been arrived at, Rumania had actually gone over to the Entente camp. The Central Powers had indeed not been wanting in offers to the Rumanian Government between Italy's entry into the war (March 1915) and the conclusion of the treaties with Bulgaria (Sept. 1915), but had made their concessions conditional on the active intervention of Rumania on their side. But the leading statesmen of Bucharest would not agree to this; for in spite of the great military successes of the Central Powers, their final victory seemed to them doubt ful. They accordingly continued to insist on important cessions of territory in the Bukovina and Transylvania by AustriaHungary in return for a continuance of their neutrality. To this, however, Burian, strongly influenced by Tisza, refused. to agree, although not only the German Government but also Conrad von Hotzendorff actively supported Rumania's demands. Thus the negotiations, which had been reluctantly continued by Burian, remained without results. Even Bulgaria's adhesion to the Central Powers, and the successful campaign against Serbia, did not produce any change in the attitude of the two Governments. The majority of Rumanian politicians counted on a rapid change in the military situation, and the Entente diplomatists made every effort to confirm them in this belief. But the Rumanian Government maintained its conviction that it must for the present preserve its neutrality. It was the Russian victories at Lutsk and Okna which first led to a change in their views. At the end of July 1916 the Vienna Cabinet was aware, from its ambassador, Count Czernin, that preparations for war were being completed in Bucharest, that negotiations were being carried on with the Entente Powers as to the conditions of going over to them, and that the probability was that Rumania would draw the sword as soon as the harvest was garnered. In spite of this, and though the news during the next few weeks was more and more unfavourable, Burian firmly refused the demands made by Rumania for the maintenance of their neutrality, and was not to be moved from his resolve even by the German Government and Conrad von Hbtzendorff. And so towards the end of August the union of Rumania with the Entente Powers was accomplished, in return for far-reaching territorial concessions granted by them to their new ally at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On August 27 - on the day of Italy's formal rupture with Germany - followed Rumania's declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, and hostilities began without delay. But the hope of the Entente that Rumania's entry on their side would quickly decide the war in their favour was not fulfilled. After preliminary Rumanian successes against the weak troops of the Habsburg Monarchy, the armies of the Quadruple Alliance, fighting under German leadership, achieved a decisive victory. On Dec. 6 1915 Bucharest was taken, and at the beginning of Jan. 1917 two-thirds of Rumania was occupied.

Turkey's danger had grown through the entry of Rumania into the war on the side of the Entente Powers. She, therefore, addressed herself to the Central Powers with fresh New demands. So early as Sept. 28 1916 Germany assured the Porte that, in accordance with her treaty engage- ments with ments, she would not conclude a separate peace, would Turkey. allow Turkey a share, proportionate to her military efforts, in any territorial conquests, and would not agree to any peace so long as Turkish territory was occupied by the enemy. Soon afterwards, on Jan. 11 1917, a further agreement was arrived at between these two Powers, in which the abolition of the Capitulations, which Turkey found oppressive, was contemplated. The provisions of these two treaties were expanded in a manner favourable to Turkey on Nov. 27 1917. The AustroHungarian Government, after long hesitation, associated itself on March 22 1917 with the German settlements of Sept. 28 1916 and Jan. 11 1917. But her ratification was not given.

A treaty was signed between Austria-Hungary and Turkey on May 30 1918 as to the question of the Capitulations, which corresponded to the Turco-German one of Nov. 27 1917, and by which Austria-Hungary pledged herself not to sign any peace which should reestablish the Capitulations.

The success of the Central Powers in Rumania was a ray of light in the last days of the Emperor Francis Joseph I., who had entered the war with a heavy heart, and always First Peace remained full of anxious care as to the fate of his Proosals. empire. His armies and those of his allies had achieved decisive victories in several theatres of war in the course of the year 1916; they had occupied new territories, and in other quarters had successfully repelled the increasingly formidable offensive of their enemies. The battles on the Rumania Joins the Entente. Isonzo had thrown the heroism of the Austro-Hungarian troops into particularly clear relief. But the number and military efficiency of their enemies increased, and since Great Britain commanded the sea and the United States supported them more and more lavishly, the Entente armies had at their disposition vast masses of arms and munitions of every kind and also immense supplies of foodstuffs. The Central Powers, thrown back upon their own industrial resources, and hampered in the import of foodstuffs and the production of weapons by the British blockade, could not keep pace in the race. For this reason the desire to put an end to this internecine struggle of the nations grew from month to month, especially in AustriaHungary, where from the beginning of the war a great part of the population had only fought unwillingly for interests which were not regarded as their own. In the course of the year 1914 Francis Joseph, for his part, had not refused to listen to suggestions for a peace which should take into account the most important interests of his empire; he had approved the numerous proposals for peace which in the years 1915-6 had come from more or less authoritative quarters; but he had always insisted most strongly that these negotiations must be conducted in full agreement with his allies, and especially with Germany. But all these peace proposals had proved abortive, since neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary saw the possibility of ending the war on any terms commensurate with the military situation and their desires. But in Oct. 1916, in order to prove to the public opinion of the world that it was not the insatiability of the Central Powers which stood in the way of peace, Burian proposed to the German Imperial Chancellor, at the general headquarters at Pless, that the Quadruple Alliance should inform their enemies, through neutral channels, of their conditions of peace, and also publish them, in order to enlighten their own peoples as to their war aims and win over the neutral Powers to an active intervention with the enemy Governments. Bethmann Hollweg and the other German statesmen agreed in principle with Burian's idea. But they declined, for their part, to communicate their concrete peace conditions, since they felt themselves bound, especially in the Belgian question, to advance demands which their enemies, and especially Great Britain, could not possibly accept. On this point Strained Relations excited debates took place and serious conflicts be- with tween the Vienna and Berlin Cabinets, in the course of Germany. which the Austrians demanded the recall of Tschirschky, the German ambassador at the Court of Vienna, who represented the German point of view with uncompromising harshness. Even the sovereigns of Austria-Hungary and Germany took part in this conflict. The Emperor William sought insistently to convince his ally that Germany could not fall in with Burian's plan. It was one of Francis Joseph's last acts to invoke every means in order to accomplish a settlement of the outstanding difficulties. It was only after long negotiations - Francis Joseph having in the meantime died on Nov. 21 1916 - that it was possible to reach a compromise. It was agreed to submit the proposal of the Quadruple Alliance to their enemies through the neutral Powers, and immediately to enter upon deliberations as to a peace, in which the peace conditions of the Quadruple Alliance should be exactly defined.

The death of Francis Joseph and the accession of the Emperor Charles to the throne of Austria-Hungary notably reinforced the peace party at Vienna. In his very first declarations Charles emphasized his firm intention of doing everything in his power to put an end to the terrible world conflict. In this attitude he was most strongly confirmed by his wife, Zita, by her mother, the influential Maria Antonia of Parma, and by his brothers-inlaw, Sixtus and Xavier. On Dec. 12 1916 the peace offer of the Quadruple Alliance was made public. It contained a promise to submit to a conference of the Powers proposals which should aim at assuring to their peoples existence, honour, and freedom of development, and at laying foundations calculated to establish a lasting peace. In conversations with Germany, Austria-Hungary defined her standpoint as follows: - She claimed the integrity of her territory, tri fling frontier rectifications as against Russia, a more favourable strategic frontier against Rumania, the cession to AustriaHungary of a small portion of the territory of the Serbian Monarchy and of larger portions to Bulgaria and Albania, and a more favourable strategic frontier against Italy; in addition to this the economic union of Serbia with the Habsburg Monarchy, and Albanian autonomy under an Austro-Hungarian protectorate. Independently of the peace activity of the Quadruple Alliance, Mr. Woodrow Wilson, who had shortly before been re-elected President of the United States, on Dec. 18 1916 invited the belligerent Powers to communicate their peace terms, and had a note handed in at London in this sense on Dec. 21. Both proposals, however, were declined by the Entente Powers. On Dec. 30 1916 Briand, on the part of France, declared the peace offer of the Quadruple Alliance to be a war manoeuvre, and that all negotiations were useless, so long as no security was given for the restoration of violated rights and liberties and the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination. In the note drawn up in concert by the Entente Powers on Jan. r2 1917, in answer to President Wilson's communication of Dec. 18, all the blame for the outbreak of war was imputed to the Central Powers, and the demand was formulated, among other things, for compensation for all war damages, the restoration of AlsaceLorraine to France, and from Austria-Hungary in particular proportionate cessions of territory to Italy as well. The German Government, which had by now fallen into more and more obvious dependence on the higher army command, thereupon resolved to carry on the war by the employment of the most extreme measures, the most important and most promising of which was indicated in authoritative quarters to be unlimited submarine warfare.

Baron Burian, meanwhile, had ceased to be Austro-Hungarian foreign minister on Dec. 22 1916, being succeeded by Count Ottokar Czernin, the former ambassador at Bucharest. Austro-Hungarian statesmen generally did not share the exaggerated expectations of German military circles as to the effects of the submarine campaign, and Czernin in particular gave open expression to his doubts about the subjugation of England within a few months, which the German authorities seemed to regard as certain. He drew attention to the danger of an active intervention of the United States, if unlimited submarine warfare were entered upon. The Emperor Charles shared his minister's views. But the continual pressure of German statesmen and the German higher command, powerfully supported by the Emperor William, at last succeeded in obtaining the consent of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the unlimited submarine warfare. The war was resumed by Germany and her allies by land, by sea and in the air. But the hope of forcing their enemies to their knees by decisive successes was not realized. During the year 1917 there were indeed moments in which it looked as if the final decision would be in their favour. But their enemies, in spite of all the successes of the Central Powers and their allies, rejected all thoughts of a peace unsatisfactory to them.

The opening of unlimited submarine warfare was followed immediately by the rupture of diplomatic relations between the Cabinets of Berlin and Washington, and on April 6 American 1917 by the declaration of war on Germany by the Declara- United States. It was not till Dec. 7 1917 that the tion of United States declared war on Austria-Hungary. war. Meanwhile, since the successes of the submarine warfare, though in themselves considerable, did not produce the result foretold by Germany, the Emperor Charles's inclination towards peace grew from month to month. Under the influence of his entourage he determined, by secret negotiations with the enemy, to work for a peace which should include Cet a guarantee of the integrity of the Habsburg Mon- Proposals. archy by the Entente Powers. His brother-in law, Prince Sixtus of Bourbon Parma, undertook the role of mediator. On March 24 the Emperor Charles empowered him, by letter, to declare to M. Poincare, President of the French Republic, that in order to obtain peace he would Peace Proposal of Dec. 1916. Czernin Succeeds Burian. exert every effort in his power to support the just claims of France to Alsace-Lorraine vis-a-vis his allies. In other questions too, notably in that of Belgium, the Emperor Charles showed a wish to further the desires of the enemy Powers as far as possible. On the other hand, there was no mention in Charles's letter of any readiness to cede Austrian territory to Italy. Count Czernin, who was well informed as to essentials in the negotiations, but was unacquainted with the text of the imperial letter, endeavoured in the meanwhile to win over the German Government to the idea of peace. On March 27 1917 an agreement was signed at Vienna between him and Bethmann Hollweg which provided for a minimum and maximum programme. In the former the restoration of the territorial status quo ante bellum of the Central Powers in the E. and W. was laid down as the condition precedent to their evacuation of the occupied provinces of Russia (except Poland), Serbia, Albania, Greece and Rumania; in the latter, which was to hold good in the event of the war taking a more favourable turn, provision was made for a permanent acquisition of enemy territory in proportion to their respective military achievements. In this event Germany's field of expansion was to be in the East, Austria-Hungary's in Rumania.

Shortly afterwards, April 3 1917 i the Emperor Charles and Count Czernin arrived at Homburg as guests of the Emperor William. Czernin here came forward with a proposal (the connexion with Prince Sixtus's demarche being noteworthy) that Germany might make concessions to France in Alsace-Lorraine, and as a substitute for her losses in the West take permanent possession of a Poland supplemented by Galicia. These plans found a basis in the prospect of concluding a favourable peace with Russia, which had opened up shortly before the abdication of the Tsar Nicholas II. in March. To reinforce his efforts, Count Czernin, on April 14, sent to the Emperor William a report, drawn up by himself and the Emperor Charles in person, in which the internal situation of the Habsburg Monarchy was painted in the blackest colours, and its collapse, involving a revolution and the downfall of the dynasty, was represented as imminent. At the same time Czernin renewed in authoritative quarters in Germany his offer to compensate the German Empire for eventual losses in Alsace-Lorraine by the permanent acquisition of Poland enlarged by the addition of Galicia. But the Emperor William and his counsellors refused to open negotiations with the enemy on this basis, and urged the continuation of the war. It soon afterwards became clear that the secret negotiations conducted by Sixtus of Parma with the Entente Powers would not lead to the results desired by the Emperor Charles and Czernin. For Italy held by her bond, and demanded the cession of all those provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy which had been promised her by the Treaty of London of April 26 1915. To this, however, the Emperor Charles, particularly in view of the military situation at the time, neither would nor could consent.

The negotiations with the Western Powers having thus for the present led to no tangible results, the Emperor Charles and Count Czernin decided at Kreuznach (May 17-18 Agreement 1917) to come to an agreement with the German with Government, in which there was no further men- Germany. ton of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, but in which it was stipulated by Austria-Hungary that not only should her integrity be guaranteed but she should receive considerable accessions of territory in the Balkans. Germany, furthermore, agreed in the event of her being able to carry out " the territorial incorporation (Angliederung) of Courland and Lithuania, together with the dependence (Anlehnung) of Poland contemplated on the German side," that " Rumania so far as occupied, with the exception of the Dobruja (frontier anterior to 1913) and a border strip to the S. of the Cernavoda-Constantza railway, falls as a separate State into the Austro-Hungarian sphere of interests, subject to a guarantee of Germany's economic interests in Rumania." On the fulfilment of these conditions Austria-Hungary consented to renounce her condominium in Poland, and promised to declare her desinteressement, political and military, in Poland. On June 8 1917 the Emperors William II. and Charles signed an agreement as to Poland's military forces, by which their organization was placed entirely in the hands of Germany.

The war continued. The Quadruple Alliance waged it with the exertion of all its military strength, and even now gained not inconsiderable successes. On the western front the Germans held at bay the attacks of the French and British troops, lavishly furnished with war material. On the eastern front the armies of the Alliance fought successfully against the Russians. In the S. the armies of Austria-Hungary, stiffened by German troops, undertook an invasion of Italy which led to the occupation of further Italian territory. But all these successes did not suffice to compel a desire for peace on the part of the enemy, while, in the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, war weariness, furthered by a skilfully managed propaganda on the part of the Entente, kept spreading to wider circles among the soldiers and citizens of the Central Powers and their allies. This feeling among the people, and the recognition of the fact that the war could only be ended by diplomatic means, decided Czernin to resume with the greatest energy his efforts to achieve a peace which should preserve the vital interests of the monarchy. In this he was strongly supported by the declaration made by the majority in the German Reichstag on July 19 1917 in favour of a peace by agreement, in which the forcible acquisition of territory, and oppressive political, economic and financial measures were repudiated, and the freedom of the seas and the renunciation by the enemy of the economic blockade of the Central Powers were demanded. Yet neither the Pope's official efforts for peace nor the secret Revertera-Armand (July - Aug. 1917) and Mensdorff-Smuts (Dec. 1917) negotiations led to tangible results, since the enemy had exact information as to the critical internal situation of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, and, counting upon the strong support of the United States for the following year, made conditions to which, in view of their favourable military situation at the end of the year 1917, Germany and her allies would not accede. At this time, moreover, the prospect was opening to them of concluding a favourable peace with their enemies in the E. which would enable them to fall with their full strength upon their enemies in the West.

The revolution which had taken place in Russia in March 1917 had not brought peace; on the contrary, the numerous negotiations which took place between the Central Powers and Russia, having as their aim the conclu- Effect of sion of a separate peace dra ed on inconclusive) P P, gg Y The war went on; it was waged successfully by Ger many, and brought wide territories in the East into the possession of the allies. But a decisive change took place for the first time in the attitude of the Russian politicians in Nov. 1917, when the second phase of the Russian revolution - the " social revolutionary" phase led by Kerensky - was succeeded by a third, that of the " Bolsheviks," led by Lenin and Trotsky. As early as the end of Nov. 1917 the new Government summoned all the combatant Powers to enter immediately upon an armistice and begin negotiations for the conclusion of a general peace, which should assure to every nation freedom of economic and cultural development. When the Entente Powers refused to comply with this summons, the Russians on Dec. 3 entered into a suspension of hostilities with Germany and her allies, which was to last till Dec. 17. On Dec. 15 the suspension of hostilities was succeeded by an armistice, which was to last till Jan.

14 1918 and then be continued with the right to de- Negotia- nounce it on seven days' notice. Peace negotiations dons at began on Dec. 22 at Brest-Litovsk. They were con- Brest ducted in public. The upshot was that on Dec. 25 the Litovsk. Quadruple Alliance accepted the Russian proposals for the conclusion of a peace without annexations and indemnities as the basis for a general peace. At the suggestion of the Russian delegates, the negotiations were suspended for ten days and a request was addressed to the enemies of the Quadruple Alli ance that they should take part in further deliberations on the basis of the resolutions adopted on Dec. 25. But the Entente Powers refused. Thereupon negotiations were begun (Jan. 9 1918) for a separate peace between Russia and the Quadruple Alliance. But they did not run so smoothly as the majority of Austro-Hungarian politicians had hoped. Trotsky, the chief of the Russian delegation, demanded full freedom for the plebiscites to be held in the Russian provinces occupied by the Central Powers, and with this object proposed that their troops should evacuate them. On the rejection of this proposal by the German and Austro-Hungarian delegates, Trotsky protracted the negotiations in order meanwhile to introduce Bolshevik ideas into the territories of the Quadruple Alliance. The progress of the negotiations was hampered by quarrels among the Russians, and by the appearance at Brest-Litovsk Treaty of an Ukrainian delegation which pressed for the with the establishment of a Russian federal republic. Since on Ukraine. P this question no agreement could be reached, the representatives of the Ukraine, on Jan. 24 1918, announced the complete independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and on Feb. 9 concluded a separate peace with the Quadruple Alliance, which, so far as Austria-Hungary was concerned, left the frontier between the two States unchanged. Inspired by his eagerness to bring to the starving population of Austria, and above all to the inhabitants of Vienna, the longed-for " bread peace," which stipulated for the delivery of foodstuffs from the Ukraine, Czernin, in compliance with the violent desire of the Ukrainian delegation, carried out their demand for the incorporation of the district of Cholm in the newly created republic, and for the erection of East Galicia into an autonomous Austrian crown territory.

The negotiations with Russia had meanwhile been continued. Czernin, zealously seconded in his efforts for peace by the Emperor Charles, pressed for a conclusion, but met Peace of with determined opposition from the German negotia- Litovsk. tors. On Feb. 10 1918 Trotsky declared that Russia, renouncing a formal treaty of peace, regarded the state of war against the Quadruple Alliance as at an end, and would reduce her troops to a peace footing on all fronts. But since this solution did not meet with the whole-hearted consent of the Central Powers, Germany resumed the struggle. The Austro-Hungarian troops did not enter into the war against Soviet Russia, but after a few days joined the march of the German troops into the Ukraine. The Russians, defeated by Germany in the field, now changed their tactics and declared themselves prepared to conclude a formal peace, which was signed on March 3 1918 at Brest-Litovsk. It brought the Habsburg Monarchy no accessions of territory, but, by the official retirement of the Russians from the ranks of their enemies, it involved a considerable strengthening of the Quadruple Alliance.

Poland had become independent of Russia by the provisions of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk; but this did not settle the Polish question. The negotiations conducted by the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin as to the fate of Poland in the spring and summer of 1917 led to no issue, since the conflicting interests of the two Powers concerned were shown to be irreconcilable. The plan advocated by Austria, that the Archduke Charles Stephen should be made regent, and afterwards king, was accepted neither by the Emperor William nor by the German Government. In the autumn of 1917 the decision made earlier in the year to abandon Poland to Germany and compensate Austria-Hungary in Rumania was given up, and the Austro-Polish solution advocated by the Emperor Charles and Czernin was approved in principle. In the negotiations which followed as to the carrying-out of this plan, however, the old opposition of interests again became apparent. Germany declared that she would make her acquiescence in the Austro-Polish solution contingent upon the cession to her of large portions of Polish territory, as " rectifications of frontier," and, beyond this, upon her retaining a decisive influence upon the utilization of the economic and military forces of a Polish State which was not to be incorporated in Austria-Hungary but merely joined to her by a personal union. To this, however, the Vienna Government would not agree, and once more the attempt to reach a definitive solution of the Polish question had broken down. The Poles, anxious about their future and keenly desirous to make it as favourable as possible to themselves, took advantage of these differences to continue negotiations with both sides, in order to secure for their State the widest possible territorial extension and the greatest possible measure of independence. They resolutely protested against the cession of the district of Cholm to the Ukraine, and on March 4 1918, with the aid of the Poles in the Habsburg Monarchy, they succeeded in obtaining the signature, by the Powers concerned in the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Feb. 9, of a protocol in which it was laid down that the frontiers between Poland and the Ukraine were to be settled by a new agreement, arrived at with the cooperation of the Poles, and perhaps to be altered in favour of the Poles. The negotiations between the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin as to the future destiny of Poland still went on. The former clung to the Austro-Polish solution, but it was evident from many indications that the German Government showed less and less inclination to consent to it. In July 1918, after the luckless Austrian offensive in Italy, the German Imperial Chancellor, Count Hertling, declared that he would no longer recognize the Austro-Polish solution. Poland was to have the free choice of her future form of government, but before its establishment must come to arrangements with the Central Powers, permanently calculated to secure their economic and military interests. Austria-Hungary agreed with these proposals in principle. But the negotiations which were now entered upon led, like all the preceding ones, to no definitive results, though they provided the Poles once more with the desired opportunity for fishing in troubled waters.

The ending of the war between Russia and the Quadruple Alliance also compelled Rumania to conclude peace with the victors, having already, on Dec. 17 1917, had to sub- Peace mit to an armistice. After rather long negotiations the Treaty peace preliminaries were signed at the château of with Buftea near Bucharest on March 6 1918, and on May 7 Ru m ania. the definitive peace; but the latter was not ratified by Rumania. Austria-Hungary received a favourable strategic frontier in the Carpathians, important economic concessions, and the promise of an immediate evacuation of the provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy still occupied by Rumania. King Ferdinand had to thank the personal intervention of the Emperor Charles for the fact that he retained his crown.

The successes in the East, gratifying though they were in themselves, did not deceive the governing circles at the Ballplatz as to the danger on the verge of which they hovered. They knew that the filling-up of the seriExhaus ousl depleted ranks of the troops, the production of ten on o f th e Y P P P Monarchy. arms and munitions, the provisioning of the soldiers and of the population, would get more difficult every month. Reports kept coming in as to the increasing war-weariness of the troops, and the more and more openly expressed anti-dynastic sentiments of the non-German or non-Magyar portions of the population of the monarchy, as to the correctness of which there could be no doubt. All these reasons increased the desire of the Emperor Charles and of Czernin to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible. As early as the autumn of 1917 the German Government had been informed from Vienna that AustriaHungary's strength was exhausted, and insistently urged to sacrifices which might content the enemy. The same point of view had been adhered to during the negotiations at BrestLitovsk. Germany was to find in the East compensations for the cessions which she must make in the West in order to bring the enemy round the peace-table. For the negotiations secretly carried on by several Austro-Hungarian statesmen with the representatives of the Entente States had left no doubt as to the fact that there could be no thought of a serious entry upon peace negotiations on the part of the Western Powers before The Polish Question, 1917. Germany should have handed in precise declarations which should meet their views in the questions of Belgium and AlsaceLorraine. It was, then, very opportune for the Court of Vienna when President Wilson, in his message to Congress of Jan. 8 1918, defined the Fourteen Points, in which he perceived a suitable basis for the establishment of a lasting peace. It is true that several of these points involved considerable damage to Austro-Hungarian interests: but in their entirety they seemed to afford Czernin the possibility of initiating peace negotiations. He endeavoured in divers ways, and especially through the mediation of the King of Spain, to enter into negotiations with President Wilson, but failed to attain his end. Equally fruitless were the informal conversations carried on by Austro-Hungarian representatives, in intelligence with their Government, with French delegates in Switzerland and other places. Czernin firmly refused the demand of the Western Powers for the conclusion of a separate peace; but he continued his efforts at negotiation, though he knew that German headquarters had prepared a new campaign in the West which was intended to be decisive.

At the beginning of April 1918, shortly after this German offensive had successfully begun, Czernin emphasized, in an address to a delegation of the Viennese town coun cil, his loyalty to Germany, as proved by his rejec tion of the French peace offers, which were con ditional on the recognition of France's claims to Alsace-Lorraine. Clemenceau, the French prime minister, declared this assertion to be a lie, and, in the course of the publicist feud that followed, published among other things the letter of the Emperor Charles to Prince Sixtus of March 24 1917, in which he alluded to his willingness to advocate with his Allies France's " just claims " to Alsace-Lorraine. The Austro-Hungarian monarch's loyalty to his alliance was thus placed in an equivocal light, and Czernin's refusal to accept full responsibility for the Emperor Charles's proceedings led to his resignation, Count Burian being reappointed as his successor. In order to calm the agitation of the Emperor William and the German statesmen and generals, the Emperor Charles had to make another " journey to Canossa " at Spa, and there, on May 12 1Q18, he set his signature to agreements for a closer political and military union between the two countries, the coming into force of which would have meant heavy damage to the independence of Austria-Hungary. But since the condition of the validity of this treaty, namely an understanding between the two Powers on the Polish question, broke down, the Spa agreement, too, remained a scrap of paper.

Meanwhile Germany was putting forth her last strength in the hope of achieving a decisive success. But her initial successes were followed by reverses. Austria-Hungary had Last taken part in the battles on the western front, but Stages.fo nl within modest limits. In une 1 18 she attem ted the War. Y J 9 P a sudden attack on Italy with the principal body of her troops. But here, too, the decisive victory which had been expected was not achieved. These failures, together with the ever-increasing lack of effective soldiers, arms, munitions and foodstuffs, deepened the longing of the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy for peace. In addition, the Emperor Charles became alive to the more and more open opposition of the non-German and non-Magyar peoples of his dominions, and likewise to the revolutionary spirit which was becoming conspicuous among the working-classes in many places, and he began to tremble for his crown and the fate of the dynasty. In proportion as the German hope of extorting peace by force of arms diminished, a more favourable prospect seemed to open up for the efforts of Austro-Hungarian statesmen to put an end to the war by way of diplomatic negotiations. At the end of July 1918, Baron Kuhlmann, the German Secretary Nerotia- of State for Foreign Affairs, had been compelled to bons for r esin in conse uence of his sa in in the Reichsta that Peace. g q Y g g an end of the war through a purely military decision could not be expected. But by Aug. 14 Ludendorff himself, who had played a prominent part in bringing about Kiihl mann's fall, declared at headquarters in Spa that they could no longer hope to break the military spirit of the foe by force of arms. Thus when Burian again approached the German Government, he no longer met with any opposition on principle. Yet great differences presented themselves in the course of the deliberations as to the course to be adopted. The Germans wanted to wait for an improvement of the military situation in the West and then begin negotiations with the enemy through a neutral Power - Holland or Spain - while AustroHungarian statesmen advocated an immediate and open appeal to all the combatant Powers. At the beginning of Sept. 1918 the German Minister Hintze spent some time in Vienna in order to arrive at an agreed course of action. But since this could not be achieved, Burian determined, without regard to Germany's opposition, to have an appeal sent out to all the combatant States for the opening of peace negotiations. President Wilson answered, however, after a few days' interval, that he had repeatedly and in the 'plainest tenns made known the conditions on which he was prepared to consider the conclusion of peace; hence the Government of the United States could not and would not accept a proposal for the holding of a conference concerning a matter in which it had already clearly made known its attitude and aims. And the Cabinets of Paris and London were equally cold. The sole result of Burian's new effort for peace was the increase of the Entente's hopes of victory. On Sept. 15 ensued a violent attack against the Bulgarian army, in the ranks of which war-weariness had for long past made serious inroads. The Bulgarian troops offered but little resistance; great bodies of them laid down their arms, and returned to their homes. The Sofia Government, at the head of which Malinov, who was friendly to the Entente, had for some months taken the place of Radoslavov, resolved to propose an armistice, which was granted on Sept. 29 under conditions which signified for the Central Powers the loss of the Balkans. King Ferdinand abdicated. These events, and the great successes of the English troops in Palestine, produced their effect upon Turkey. At the beginning of October the fall of Enver and Tal'at took place at Constantinople, and thus the way was opened here too for a separate peace. An armistice was concluded between Turkey and the Entente on Oct. 31 1918, which brought the Dardanelles and the Bosporus under their power, and pledged the Turks to break off all relations with the Central Powers.

Meanwhile the catastrophe had taken place in AustriaHungary as well. Encouraged by the repeated pronouncements of President Wilson as to the right of nations to self-determination, the separatist ideas of those peoples of the monarchy which did not acknowledge German or Hungarian nationality became more and more articulate. There were disturb ances in various parts of the monarchy, and these Break-up disruptive influences made it month by month M th e P Y Monarchy. increasingly difficult to keep the army efficient for war. Both Austria-Hungary and Germany now decided to address to President Wilson the offer of an armistice, to be followed by negotiations for peace. To this offer the President at first made no reply; and thereupon the Emperor Charles, in order to save the dynasty, issued on Oct. 16 a manifesto in which he proclaimed that Austria, in accordance with the will. of her peoples, was to be erected into a Federal State, in which every race would be free to establish its own form of body politic on the territory occupied by it. But the union of the Austrian Poles with an independent Polish State was not to be anticipated by this. The imperial manifesto was only to apply to Austria. For Hungary, where they were already working for a personal union and for a complete separation from Austria, the manifesto laid stress upon the integrity of the Hungarian kingdom. It thus became clear to the Southern Sla y s that they must no longer hope for a realization of their national aspirations within the bounds of the monarchy. But the Emperor Charles's expectation of conciliating the opinion of the Austrian Slays by means of the manifesto met with no success. President Wilson, too, rejected the Vienna Cabinet's peace offer. He declared Czernin's Peace Efforts, 1918. Burian again Foreign Minister. 'that the' Government of the United States had afready recognized Czechoslovakia as a belligerent Power and the Czechoslovak National Council as a belligerent Government, as well as the justice of the national aspirations of the Southern Slays. It was, therefore, for these peoples themselves to decide which of the resolutions of the Austrian Government were acceptable to them. Upon this the request for an armistice made by the Emperor Charles at the beginning of October was declared to be no longer in force. During October independent national representative bodies assembled in Prague, Agram, Laibach and Vienna. The Emperor's dominions thus dissolved and slipped from his grasp. These internal movements led to the disintegration of the armies, which up to this moment had fought bravely. The Governments of the several countries constituting the monarchy, Hungary leading the way, summoned their co-nationals to the defence of their particular frontiers or called them back home. The Emperor Charles tried to save what still could be saved. He was prepared to conclude a separate peace with the enemy on terms which would make possible the continuance of the old monarchy, even though with diminished territory and as a loose aggregation of separate territorial groups under the dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine.

On Oct. 24 Count Julius Andrassy succeeded Burian as Foreign Minister, in order to begin negotiations for a separate peace. Three days later the office of minister-president was given to Heinrich Lammasch, professor of international law and a well-known pacifist. On the same day renewed proposals for an armistice were made to President Wilson, and the peace pour parlers, which had never been entirely interrupted, were resumed in Switzerland with representatives of the Entente by various emissaries of the Habsburg Monarchy. Once more, however, they reached no result. At the end of October, after the revolution in Hungary (see Hungary: History), and when increasing numbers of the troops fighting in Italy had started homewards, the Austro-Hungarian army command asked for an armistice from the Italians, who were victoriously advancing against the demoralized and dissolving Austro-Hungarian forces. This was granted on Nov. 3 1918 on conditions of pitiless severity. Austria-Hungary had to reduce her army at once to a peace footing - only 20 divisions were excepted; to evacuate all enemy territories still occupied by her troops; to surrender to the enemy large portions of Austrian territory, and to hand over all war material actually in these territories, as well as the whole of her fleet. By this means all resistance was made impossible even after the expiry of the armistice. Utterly defenceless, the Emperor Charles had to place his own fate and that of the ancient monarchy in the hands of the victors. The latter also demanded free passage for their armies over all roads, railways and waterways of the monarchy. Germany's resistance was thus to be broken by new dangers threatening her from the south. It was only under protest, and bowing to necessity, that the Emperor Charles gave his consent to these demands, which promised to be fatal to his ally. The negotiations for a separate peace were indeed even now still carried on by the diplomatists who remained true to the dynasty, but they hardly met with a hearing from the Entente Powers.

The process of dissolution ran its course in the old monarchy. On Nov. II 1918 the Emperor Charles renounced all share in the business of government in Austria; the Lammasch Government retired. The Emperor Charles did not, however, renounce his crown. On the following day, in the Austrian National Assembly, a republic was proclaimed (see Austria, Republic or), which was at first intended to form a component part of the new German Republic. On Nov. 16 the republican form of government was introduced in Hungary. The ancient AustroHungarian Monarchy had thereby ceased to exist, and its role as a European Great Power was at an end.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Up to 1921 no comprehensive critical account had been published of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in 1910-8. The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary (1920), No. I. of the hand books prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, is a summary survey. The period 1875 to 1914 is treated in an inadequate and one-sided way in Jean Larmeroux, La Politique extirieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie (2 vols., 1918). The foreign policy of the monarchy is discussed in its connexion with world politics in. among other works, A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, vol. iv. (1918); Ernst Reventlow, Politische Vorgeschichte des grossen Kriegs (1919); Julius Hashagen, Umrisse der Weltpolitik, vol. ii. (2nd ed. 1919); Gottlob Egelhaaf, Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, vol. ii. (8th ed.) and Heinrich Friedjung, Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus, vol. ii. (1922). Friedrich Wieser's study, Oesterreichs Ende (1919), and F. Kleinwachter's book, Der Untergang OesterreichUngarns, throw more light on the internal disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy, but also contain interesting discussions of foreign policy. Meisser's Politische Chronik der Oesterreich-Ungarischen Monarchie (1910-8) and Schulthe's Geschichtskalender (1910-8) contain extracts from the reports of the proceedings of the delegations and the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments and other important documents and speeches. Of the official publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should be mentioned: Diplomatische A ktenstiicke betreffend die Ereignisse am Balkan, 13. August 5912 bis 6. November 1913 (Vienna 1914); Diplomatische Aktenstecke betreffend die Beziehung OesterreichUngarns zu Italien in der Zeit vom 22. Juli 1914 bis 27. August 1916 (Vienna 1916); Diplomatische Aktenstiicke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges 1914 and Diplomatische Aktenstucke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges: Erganzungen and Nachtrage zum OesterreichischUngarischen Rotbuch (3 parts [June 28-Aug. 27 19141, Vienna 1920). At the instance of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs there appeared Richard Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinet and die Entstehung des Weltkrieges (1919). A. F. Pribram's Die politischen Geheimvertrfige Oesterreich-Ungarns 1879 bis 1914 (1920) also contains a detailed history of the development of the Triple Alliance treaties (English trans. by A. C. Coolidge, 1920). Valuable information as to AustroHungarian foreign policy is to be found in memoirs of German and Austro-Hungarian statesmen and military commanders which have appeared since the end of the war. Among these may be especially indicated: G. Jagow, Ursachen and Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (1919); Paul von Hindenburg, Aus meinem Leben (1920); Theodor von Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg (1919); Erich Ludendorff, Kriegserinnerungen (1919); Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung fiber ihre R tigkeit 1916 bis 1918 (1920); A. von Tirpitz, Erinnerungen (1919); Karl Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg (3 vols., 1919); Karl Herding, Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei (1919 A. von Cramon, Unser OesterreichUngarischer Bundgenosse im W eltkrieg (1920); Ottokar Czernin, Im Weltkriege (1919); Julius Andrassy, Diplomatie and Weltkrieg (1920); L. Windischgratz, Vom roten zum schwarzen Prinzen (1920); Auffenberg-Komarow, Aus Oesterreichs Hate and Niedergang (1921); Erich von Falkenhayn, Die Tatigkeit der Obersten Heeresleitung 1914 bis 1916 (1919); Matthias Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkriege (1920); J. V. Szilassy, Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie (1921). Separate problems of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy are treated among others by Leopold Chlumecky, Die Agonie des Dreibundes (1915); Wilhelm Fraknoi, Kritische Studien zur Geschichte des Dreibundes (1916); Severus, Zehn Monate italienischer Neutraliteit (1915); Th. v. Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik OesterreichUngarns seit 1866 (2 vols., 1914); Die Politik im Habsburgerreich (1912); Berthold Molden, Alois Graf Aehrenthal: Sechs Jahre dusserer Politik Oesterreich-Ungarns (1917). (A. F. PR.)

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